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Transfer Pricing- At
What price?
The decision to transfer is not always based on the transfer
price. Multree Homes realised this when one of its cost centre
evolved into a profit centre
When one department of a company transfers goods to another
department, within the company, then the price at which it transfers
is known as the transfer price. There has been an ongoing debate
on the amount to be charged for the transfer. Multree
Homes ready-made home manufacturer faced a similar situation.
Its window-making department based at Nevada emerged as its
core competency. Nevertheless, it was treated as a cost centre.
The manager of the department, however, considered it a profit
centre. The evolution from a cost centre to a profit centre
was thus a learning process.
Cost Centre
The CFO of the company did not subscribe to the manager's views.
According to her, every department in a company should be treated
as supplier to other departments (internal customers). Being
a cost centre, it was obliged to control costs and maintain
quality. The price at which the windows would be transferred
would reflect the budgeted cost.
The performance of the department was evaluated on certain
key accounting parameters, primarily the cost variances. Cost
variance is the total cost incurred in resolving a particular
problem.
Pseudo Profit Centre
Many managers opposed the policy since their departments contributed
towards the value of the company. The window-making department,
in particular, wanted to be treated as a profit centre. The
request was considered. The management decided to treat it as
a pseudo profit centre. Pseudo profit centre provide goods only
to internal customers. However, these departments would report
profits by transferring goods at a marked up price
Initially, the management decided on a transfer price, which
would be marked 20% on actual cost. The results are shown in
Table 1.
| Table 1 Transfer price @ 20% mark up on actual
cost |
| |
Budget
|
Actual
|
Variance
|
| Revenues |
2,000 windows @
$120 = $240,000 2,000
|
windows @
$132 = $264,000
|
$ 24,000
|
| Cost Of Goods Sold |
2,000 windows @
$100 = $200,000
|
2,000 windows
@ $110 = $220,000
|
$20,000
|
| Gross Profit |
$40,000
|
$44,000
|
$4,000
|
The windows were transferred to the assembly department at
this price. Since this exceeded the actual cost, the department
would be reporting a variance. Hence, the manager of the department
and the CFO opposed the policy. The management, then, decided
to fix the transfer price at 20% mark up on the budgeted price.
Table 2 shows the results.
| Table 2 mark up price @ 20% mark up on budgeted
cost |
| |
Budget
|
Actual
|
Variance
|
| Revenues |
2,000 windows @
120 =$240,000
|
2,000 windows @ $120
|
0
|
| Cost Of Goods Sold |
2,000 windows @
100 = $200,000
|
2,000 windows @ $110
|
$20,000
|
| Gross Profit |
$40,000
|
$20,000
|
$20,000
|
The manager of the window-making department opposed this policy.
She felt that she could no longer motivate her staff to maintain
quality and control costs. Neither did she agree that subordinates
could be motivated if they are told that their departments were
contributing to the profits. According her, the profits were
reported only on paper.
The real profit centre
The resistance towards transfer pricing policies compelled the
management to consider the window-making department as a profit
centre. Though the department could sell its windows at the
market place, its first priority would be supplying to the assembly
department.
The transfer price, according to the CFO, in this scenario
would have to cover all the costs of the department including
the fixed costs. In other words, it should be transferred at
the standard absorbed cost. This would amount to $120. The department
could sell the excess capacity at the market to generate a surplus.
Strategically, to achieve market penetration the department
was allowed to sell at break-even rates.
Radical shift
Theoretically the best transfer price would be the market price.
However, adoption of such a policy might result in some departments
reporting variances. If on the other hand they were allowed
to buy from outside suppliers, they could negotiate and procure
the same at a lower price. This suggestion was accepted.
The profitable transfer price
It was found that there were no transfers from the window-making
department to the assembly department. This was because the
managers of the respective departments were not able to decide
on a transfer price. The CFO, then, realised that the managers'
decision to transfer depended on the transfer price. She felt
that undue importance was given to the price. According to her,
the decision to transfer should depend on the cash flow streams
of the company and transfer price should be calculated only
for profit sharing among departments.
She also opined that the rewards system influences transfer
prices adversely. The system was based on the profits generated,
through outside sales and transfers, by each of the departments.
Hence managers, usually, are at a conflict when deciding on
the transfer price.
To conclude
Companies should, therefore, develop tools that would enable
managers to determine the timing of transfers. The rewards system
should be so developed to avoid conflicts and enable the development
of an appropriate transfer pricing policy.
Related reading
The Multree Hones Transfer Pricing Evolution": M Thomas
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